Garet P.
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Hunt Program Outputs That Build the Program

Your team just spent forty hours on a hunt. They found nothing. Next week, they will start another hunt. Nothing from the first hunt will inform the second one. The queries are gone. The data sources checked are undocumented. The telemetry gaps discovered are untracked. Forty hours. Zero institutional value. This is how most hunt programs operate.

// introduction

The Hunt Program That Consumes Time and Produces Nothing Durable

Threat hunting is resource-intensive, senior analyst time, tooling access, data processing costs. But most hunt programs have no systematic process for converting hunt activity into program assets. A hunt that finds an adversary produces an incident. A hunt that finds nothing produces a verbal debrief, a closed ticket, and institutional amnesia.

The compounding problem: a program without structured outputs cannot improve. Each hunt starts from approximately the same knowledge base as the last one, because nothing from prior hunts was captured in a reusable form. Hunt outputs are not a reporting requirement, they are the mechanism by which hunting improves detection coverage, reduces telemetry gaps, and builds the institutional knowledge that makes the next hunt faster and more precise.

// framework

The Four Output Types: a Routing Framework

Every completed hunt should produce exactly one of four structured outputs. The output type determines routing, documentation standard, and downstream program impact. A single hunt can produce multiple output types simultaneously.

Output type
Definition
Routes to
Adversary finding
Confirmed or suspected malicious activity requiring escalation and response
IR escalation
Detection candidate
Hunt query that produced signal worth converting to a persistent detection rule
Detection engineering
Telemetry gap
Required evidence was absent, incomplete, or not retained for the hunt period
Coverage backlog
Negative finding
Hypothesis refuted with high-confidence telemetry, documented absence of activity
Hunt record library
The accountability principle

The only hunt failure is producing no structured output. That means the hunt consumed analyst time and generated no program value beyond the analyst's personal knowledge. Every hunt that closes without a structured output record has no accountability trail.

// output type 2

Detection Candidates: the Highest Long-Term Value Output

A detection candidate is a hunt query that produced actionable signal, activity that, if observed again, should trigger an alert. It converts one analyst's investigation into a permanent automated capability. Not every hunt query meets the quality threshold:

Detection Candidate Record, minimum fields
Candidate ID
DC-2024-047
Source hunt
H-2024-031, APT29 WMIC lateral movement hypothesis
Technique covered
T1047, Windows Management Instrumentation (lateral movement variant)
Hunt query
EventID=1 AND Image="*wmic.exe" AND ParentImage NOT IN (approved_admin_tools) AND CommandLine CONTAINS "process call create"
Signal observed
3 instances in 30-day window across 2 hosts: 1 confirmed benign (helpdesk tool), 2 unexplained pending IR review
Estimated FP rate
Low, helpdesk tool is the only known legitimate source; filterable by ParentImage exclusion
Known bypass
Parent process spoofing, supplement with Sysmon EIDs 19–21 for WMI persistence variant
Required telemetry
Sysmon Event ID 1 with full command line, confirmed available across all endpoint tiers
Assigned to
Detection engineering backlog, owner: [name] - target review: [date]

The known bypass field is non-negotiable. A detection candidate handed to engineering without documenting how it can be evaded produces a rule that gives false confidence. Every candidate should also be validated against the Atomic Red Team test for the covered technique before promotion to production.

// output type 3

Telemetry Gap Findings: a First-Class Output

A gap found during a hunt is a gap that exists right now, for a technique a threat actor in your sector is actively using. It is more operationally urgent than a gap discovered during an annual coverage review. Three gap types, each with different remediation paths:

Telemetry Gap Record: minimum fields
Gap ID
TG-2024-019
Source hunt
H-2024-031, WMI persistence hypothesis
Missing telemetry
Sysmon Event IDs 19, 20, 21 (WMI filter/consumer/binding creation)
Gap type
Missing log source, Sysmon config does not include WMI event logging
Techniques undetectable
T1546.003, WMI Event Subscription persistence
Threat relevance
APT29, FIN7, multiple ransomware affiliates use WMI persistence
Remediation
Add WMI event logging to Sysmon config, estimated 15-min config change, moderate volume increase
Priority
High, technique in active use by actors targeting our sector

The threat relevance field converts a gap record from a technical finding into a prioritizable risk item. Naming specific threat actors that use the undetectable technique provides the business case for remediation investment.

// output type 4

Negative Findings and the Absence-of-Evidence Library

Negative findings are the most systematically neglected hunt output, and the one with the highest latent value for incident scoping. A negative finding is not "we found nothing." It is a documented assertion: we searched for a specific technique in specific telemetry across a specific scope for a specific time window and did not observe evidence of it, with a confidence level based on telemetry completeness.

Three confidence levels, applied consistently:

Negative findings accumulated over time become a queryable absence-of-evidence library. When an incident occurs, the IR team can query this library to determine which techniques have been searched for and not found in recent periods, reducing scope and focusing investigation. A growing library of high-confidence negative findings is also a defensible artifact in regulatory investigations and post-incident reviews.

// documentation

The Hunt Record: Making All Four Outputs Durable

Every completed hunt requires a hunt record: the parent document that captures the full analytical context and links to each output generated. It should be readable by an analyst who was not present and must reconstruct what happened.

Hunt Record: minimum fields
Hunt ID
H-2024-031
Hypothesis
IF APT29-consistent tradecraft is present, THEN we expect WMIC spawning cmd.exe/PowerShell on privileged-account endpoints, IN Sysmon Event ID 1, WITHIN all tier-1 endpoints over 30 days
Input source
CTI report, [vendor] APT29 campaign analysis, 2024-10-15
Queries used
[verbatim query text, reproducible without modification]
Data sources checked
Sysmon EID 1 (complete), EID 3 (complete), EID 19–21 (ABSENT, see TG-2024-019)
Result
No adversary activity confirmed. 2 unexplained WMIC instances escalated as detection candidate DC-2024-047. WMI telemetry gap identified as TG-2024-019
Outputs generated
DC-2024-047 (detection candidate) | TG-2024-019 (telemetry gap) | NF-2024-083 (negative finding, medium confidence)
Confidence level
Medium, hypothesis partially testable; WMI persistence vector not covered due to telemetry gap
Follow-on hunts
Re-execute H-2024-031 after TG-2024-019 is remediated

The queries used field must be verbatim and reproducible, not a description, not pseudocode. Another analyst must be able to paste it into the SIEM and reproduce the hunt exactly. The data sources checked field is as important as the result, it defines the evidence boundary of the hunt's conclusions.

// metrics

Program Metrics That Only Become Possible with Structured Outputs

Detection candidates → production
Measures the detection engineering contribution of hunting. The primary metric for justifying hunt program investment to leadership.
Telemetry gaps identified vs. closed
Measures whether coverage is actually improving. A growing gap backlog with no closures signals a resourcing or prioritization failure.
High-confidence negative findings per technique category
Measures the organization's ability to make meaningful absence claims. A mature program can assert what it has actively looked for and not found.
Hunt re-execution rate after gap remediation
Measures whether telemetry gaps are actually being closed and tested. Gap remediation that is never followed by a re-hunt produced no detection value.
Time from hunt finding to production detection
Measures pipeline latency between a hunter finding a technique and the SOC having automated coverage for it.

These metrics require structured output records to compute. They cannot be calculated from hunt tickets or verbal debriefs. The documentation discipline and the measurement capability are the same investment.

// conclusion

A Hunt Program Is Only as Mature as Its Outputs

"A hunt that finds nothing and documents nothing cost forty analyst hours and produced zero institutional value. The documentation is not overhead, it is the product."

The value of a hunt program is not measured by how many hunts ran or whether any found an adversary. It is measured by whether the program is detectably better after six months of hunting than it was before. Detection candidates in production, telemetry gaps closed, a growing absence-of-evidence library, these only exist if outputs are structured and routed.

The closing test: take your last ten hunt records and count how many produced a detection candidate that reached production, how many identified a telemetry gap that was subsequently closed, and how many generated a negative finding with a documented confidence level. If the answer to all three is zero, you have been running hunts. You have not been running a hunt program.

Key references

Sqrrl hunting maturity model (HMM) levels 1–4, structured output documentation is the inflection point between level 2 and level 3; SANS FOR508 hunt documentation standards; Palantir ADS framework for detection candidate handoff.

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